

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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R 250910Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY SANAA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2774

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

USINT ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

USINT CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SANAA 1905

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: YE, SA, US, JO, TC, MASS, PFOR

SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT IRYANI

DEPT PASS CINCEUR FOR POLAD AND SECDEF FOR ISA

1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT IRYANI VERY MUCH BACK ON THE JOB AND CLEARLY PLEASED AT OUTPOURING OF POPULAR ACCLAIM WHICH FOLLOWED HIS TACTICAL RESIGNATION IN AUGUST. STATES KING FAISAL ASSURED HIM IN ALGIERS THAT SAG WILL FROM NOW ON FOLLOW A POLICY OF STRICT NON-INTERVENTION IN YEMEN AND WILL CHANNEL ALL ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL YARG TO HELP STRENGTHEN IT. YARG GRATIFIED BY BROAD SUPPORT MANIFESTED FOR IT AT NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT, PARTICULARLY FROM EGYPT, CONTRASTING WITH ISOLATION OF PDRY. WHILE YARG SEEKING REDUCE FRICTIONS WITH ADEN AND ENSURE A MAXIMUM OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT THROUGH RE-AFFIRMATION OF FRIENDSHIP FOR ALL POWER BLOCS, THESE ONLY PRECAUTIONARY MOVES TO REDUCE RISKS OF WAR WHILE
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YARG STRENGTHENED MILITARILY. USG COUNTED UPON TO TAKE

THE LEAD IN COORDINATING THIS. IN LONGER TERM REPUBLICAN YAR AND COMMUNIST PDRY CANNOT CO-EXIST. EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA COOPERATING TO DELIVER SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITY OF RUSSIAN ARMS TO YEMEN AS STOP-GAP MEASURE. THIS PART OF LARGER SCENARIO IN WHICH FAISAL ASSISTING EGYPT REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON SOVIETS AND ACQUIRE WEST EUROPEAN ARMS. STATUS OF OTHER EMERGENCY AND OTHER LONGER TERM MILITARY HELP REVIEWED AS WELL AS PROGRESS OF USAID PROGRAMS AND PEACE CORPS. YARG CONGRATULATED ON ELEVENTH ANNIVERSARY OF REPUBLIC.

2. BELIEVING THAT I SHOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM BEFORE GOVERNMENT CLOSES DOWN FOR MONTH OF RAMADAN, I SAW PRESIDENT IRYANI IN SANAA SEPTEMBER 24. THE TWINKLE WAS BACK IN HIS EYE AND HE LOOKED VERY MUCH A MAN ON TOP OF THINGS.

3. I SAID THAT DURING MY AUGUST LEAVE, TELEGRAMS CONCERNING PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION HAD FOLLOWED ME AROUND EUROPE. I HAD NOT FELT SLIGHTEST HESITATION IN CONTINUING VACATION, IN CONFIDENCE, WHICH I SUSPECTED PRESIDENT HAD SHARED, THAT YEMENI PEOPLE WOULD NOT LET RESIGNATION STAND. IN THE EVENT, MY CONFIDENCE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIED. PRESIDENT LAUGHED.

4. I NOTED THAT FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH YARG LEADERS, IT APPEARED THAT ONE OF THE SEVERAL FACTORS LEADING TO PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION HAD BEEN HIS IRRITATION OVER SAUDI MANIPULATION IN YEMEN AIMED AT PUSHING YARG TOWARD OPEN CONFRONTATION WITH PDRY. IN OUR LAST CONVERSATION IN JULY (SANAA 1338) PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAD MENTIONED HIS ANGER OVER EVIDENCE THAT SAG AMBASSADOR SUDAIRY USING HIS RESOURCES TO BRING ABOUT PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL. ONE OF THE SEVERAL CONSEQUENCES OF PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION HAD BEEN TO PUT SAG SOMEWHAT ON THE DEFENSIVE AND PRODUCE STRONG RE-AFFIRMATION OF ITS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT. I ASKED WHY AT THAT POINT, YARG HAD NOT PRESSED ITS ADVANTAGE TO SEEK IN POLITE AND BROTHERLY ARAB FASHION THE REPLACEMENT OF THE MAN REGARDED RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST OF THE TROUBLEMAKING. BY WRITING TO

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KING FAISAL TO SAY THAT SAG ACTIVITIES IN NO WAY RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS RESIGNATION, PRESIDENT HAD IN EFFECT TAKEN SAG OFF THE HOOK.

5. IRYANI REPLIED THAT YARG HAD SENT HALF A DOZEN SIGNALS TO FAISAL THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS HINTING THAT IT WISHED SAG WOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN REPLACING SUDAIRY. THESE HAD BEEN STUDIOUSLY IGNORED.

THEREFORE, IN ARAB TERMS, FURTHER HINTS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SEEMLY. ALSO, SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS HAD LEFT THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE BEHIND, OR AT LEAST SO PRESIDENT HOPED. AT ALGIERS' NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE HE HAD HAD LONG TALKS WITH KING FAISAL AND PRINCE SULTAN. IN EFFECT ACKNOWLEDGING ERROR OF SAG'S PAST APPROACH TO YEMEN, FAISAL HAD PROMISED THAT FROM NOW ON HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CHANNEL ITS FINANCIAL AND PROJECT ASSISTANCE THROUGH CENTRAL YARG, DISCONTINUING THE SUBSIDIES TO TRIBES AND INDIVIDUALS WHICH HAD BEEN SO DISRUPTIVE OF YARG'S EFFORTS TO PRODUCE INTERNAL STABILITY. PRESIDENT REMARKED THAT PROOF WOULD BE IN THE PUDDING, E.G. WOULD PRINCE KHALID SUDAIRY, GOVERNOR OF NAJRAN CEASE MANIPULATING TRIBES OF NORTHEASTERN YEMEN THROUGH SUBSIDIES? PRESIDENT SAID HE MOST GRATEFUL TO US EMBASSIES IN JIDDA AND SNAA WHICH DESERVED MUCH OF THE CREDIT FOR APPARENT CHANGE IN SAUDI ATTITUDE. PRESIDENT AWARE USG HAD CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT BRING ABOUT BETTER SAG UNDERSTANDING OF YEMENI REALITIES.

6. ON THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE, I SAID THAT FROM ALL REPORTS YAR COULD BE GRATIFIED BY THE BROAD SUPPORT EVIDENCED TOWARDS IT AS OPPOSTED TO PDRY. THIS WAS, I FELT, A RESULT OF GOOD DIPLOMACY AND POLICY. EVIDENTLY ONLY CASTRO HAD COME OUT FOR PDRY AND THAT HAD GOTTEN HIM INTO TROUBLE. PRESIDENT NODDED WITH SATISFACTION. SAID QADHAFI CONTINUED TO BE A CRAZY MAN (IN INSISTING TWO YEMENS UNITS IMMEDIATELY) BUT OTHERWISE THE GENERALIZED SUPPORT FOR YAR VERY REASSURING. IN FRONT OF PRESIDENT AND SEVERAL OTHER ARAB LEADERS, SADAT HAD CHARGED PDRY CHAIRMAN SALIM RUBAYYY' ALI WITH JEOPARDIZING ARAB INTERESTS BY SUBORDINATING ADEN TO RUSSIA, AND HAD STATED THAT GUN FOR GUN, TANK FOR TANK, AND
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PLAOE FOR PLANE, EGYPT WOULD MATCH PDRY RECEIPTS OF WEAPONRY FROM RUSSIA WITH DELIVERIES OF ITS OWN TO YAR. EGYPT, SADAT INFORMED PDRY CHAIRMAN, WOULD STAND BEHIND NORTH YEMENOIF IT WAS ATTACKED BY THE SOUTH. PDRY SABOTAGE AND TRAINING OF SUBVERSIVES MUST CEASE IMMEDIATELY.

NOTE BY OCT: NOT PASSED CINCEUR AND SECDEF.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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R 250910Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY SANAA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2775

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

USINT ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

USINT CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDTN

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

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EXDIS

7. I SAID THIS WAS GOOD NEWS AND REFLECTED WISDOM OF YARG'S SEEKING SUPPORT ACROSS THE BOARD. MY GOVERNMENT, PRESIDENT SHOULD KNOW, UNDERSTOOD AND SUPPORTED PRESIDENT'S POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT. WE ALSO UNDERSTOOD WHY PRESIDENT, AS EVIDENCED BY JOINT COMMUNIQUE (SANAA 1804), NOW SEEKING CALM THINGS DOWN WITH PDY TO MINIMIZE RISKS OF CONTINUED HOSTILITY.

N8. PRESIDENT SAID HE MUCH APPRECIATED US UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT. HE COUNTING HEAVILY, ALSO, ON US LEADERSHIP TO HELP YEMEN BUILD AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT BY WHATEVER MEANS WE FELT MOST APPROPRIATE. IN THE LONG RUN, REPUBLICAN YEOEN COULD NOT CO-EXIST WITH THE COMMUNIST SOUTH.

9. ON QUESTION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE, I REMARKED THAT REASONABLE PROGRESS BEING MADE. AS PRESIDENT AWARE, ON JULY 10 HIS PRIME MINISTER HAD PRESSED US, JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA FOR EMERGENCY ARMS. PRIME MINISTER HAD PERHAPS BEEN SOMEWHAT OVER-EXCITED.

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HOWEVER, YEMEN'S FRIENDS APPRECIATED FACT THAT ITS SITUATION WAS GRAVE AND THAT ITS NEEDS WERE REAL.

RESPONSES HAD BEEN IN GENERAL QUITE POSITIVE. WITH US APPROVAL AND ABU DHABI FINANCIAL SUPPORT, JORDAN HAD SENT TWO SHIPMENTS OF EMERGENCY ARMS, ONE BY AIR AND ONE BY SEA; 15 SALADINS HAD ALREADY ARRIVED AND MORE WERE ON THEIR WAY. USG, FOR ITS PART, HAD AGREED TO SELL HIGH PRIORITY EQUIPMENT VALUED AT APPROXIMATELY \$2.7 MILLION FOR DELIVERY THROUGH SAUDI ARABIA. NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS ON VERGE OF COMPLETION. ABU DHABI SHOULDERS THE FINANCING ON THIS AS WELL. MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENT ON INTERIM SUPPORT WAS EGYPTIAN-SAG AGREEMENT ON DELIVERY TO YAR OF QUITE A SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITY OF EQUIPMENT TO KEEP YARG MILITARY IN BUSINESS UNTIL ARRANGEMENTS FOR RE-ORIENTING ITS ARMS INVENTORY AND TRAINING HAD BEEN WORKED OUT. I SAID I ASSUMED EGYPT'S WILLINGNESS TO RELEASE THESE ARMS AT SAG'S REQUEST AND EXPENSE WAS PART OF A BIGGER PICTURE IN WHICH FAISAL UNDERTAKING TO ASSIST SADAT IN TURNING FROM A SOVIET TO DIVERSIFIED, MORE EFFECTIVE WEST EUROPEAN INVENTORY. PRESIDENT SAID THIS CORRECT.

10. ON THE LONGER TERM MILITARY ASPECT, I NOTED THAT FROM THE WAY THINGS SHAPING UP IT LOOKED AS IF JORDAN WOULD UNDERTAKE A MAJOR PORTION OF THE GROUND FORCES TRAINING ROLE, APPARENTLY WITH THE APPROVAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF SAG. PRESIDENT SAID FAISAL HAD SO INDICATED TO HIM.

11. AS REGARDS FUTURE SAUDI ROLE, I NOTED THAT THE ELABORATE AND EXPENSIVE PLANS DRAWN UP BY SAG AFTER GEN. QABBANI'S SPRING VISIT WITH ASSISTANCE FROM OUR MILITARY MISSION IN SAUDI ARABIA, HAD BEEN RECEIVED SKEPTICALLY IN WASHINGTON. WHILE USG WANTED TO HELP YAR REBUILD ITS MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT TO BE ABLE TO DEFEND ITSELF, OUR PRIORITY CONCERN WAS FOR YEMEN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. WE FELT THAT SIZE OF PROGRAMS PROPOSED MIGHT DAMAGE YEMEN BY SADDLING IT WITH A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IT COULD NOT SUPPORT. INTERNALLY, WE RETHINKING WHAT SHOULD BE BEST APPROACH IN TERMS OF SAUDI ASSISTANCE, IN LIGHT OF WHAT JORDAN CAN
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UNDERTAKE AND BEARING IN MIND THE FRAILTY OF YEMEN'S ECONOMY.

12. PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT WANT MORE THAN WAS REASONABLE FOR HIS COUNTRY'S SITUATION. HE REPEATED THAT HE HAD CONFIDENCE IN US AND COUNTED ON IT TO WORK WITH ITS FRIENDS, WHO ALSO YEMEN'S FRIENDS, TO PRODUCE THE NEEDED PROGRAMS OF EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE. YARG DIPLOMACY WOULD DO ITS BEST BUT USE OF

US INFLUENCE WOULD CONTINUE BE THE KEY FACTOR.

13. TURNING TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, I SUMMARIZED CURRENT STATUS OF OUR AID PROGRAMS AND PROVISION OF FOOD BOTH DIRECTLY AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL CHANNELS. LATTER CONTINUING, ALTHOUGH WITH SOME CUT-BACKS, DESPITE CRITICAL US AND WORLDWIDE SHORTAGEC I CITED IN PARTICULAR THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRIANGULAR COOPERATION BETWEEN US, ABU DHABI AND YARG WHICH, THROUGH ABU DHABI'S GENEROUS GIFT THE US-MANUFACTURED DRILLING RIGS, ENABLING US GREATLY EXPAND OUR WATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

14. PRESIDENT SAID HE BEING KEPT INFORMED OF OUR AID ACTIVITIES AND WAS PLEASED AT SIGNS OF PROGRESS.

15. LASTLY, I MENTIONED THAT, THANKS TO PRESIDENT'S INVITATION, 14 PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS HAD BEEN TRAINED AND WERE ABOUT TO BEGIN WORK IN YEMEN. THIS WAS THE BEGINNING OF A PROGRAM WHICH WE HOPED COULD BE EXPANED IN FUTURE. PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS SATISFACTION AND QUESTIONED ME ON DETAILS OF VOLUNTEER ASSIGNMENTS. I NOTED THAT, UNFORTUNATELY, PEACE CORPS HAD BEEN ATTACKED BY A VICIOUS COMMUNIST-AUTHORED TRACT DISTRIBUTED BY A SENIOR YARG FONOFF OFFICIAL (SEPTTEL). I HAD CHOSEN NOT TO TRY TO REBUT THIS, FEELING THAT RECORD OF VOLUNTEERS IN YEMEN WOULD TURN OUT TO BE THE BEST REPLY. HOWEVER, I FELT YARG SHOULD CONCERN ITSELF IN THIS AFFAIR SINCE WHAT WAS INVOLVED WAS A DELIBERATE EFFORT SABOTAGE YARG'S OFFICIAL POLICY OF SPONSORING A PEACE CORPS PRESENCE IN YEMEN. PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD OF ATTACK ON
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PEACETCORPS AND WOULD SEE TO IT THAT APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATION MADE.

16. IN LEAVING, I EXTENDED MY GOVERNMENT'S CONGRATULATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 26 ELEVENTH ANNIVERSARY OF CREATION OF YEMEN ARAB REBUBLIC.

17. COMMENT: FOREGOING WOULD SEEM TO CONFIRM SUGGESTIONS MADE TO US BY OTHER YARG OFFICIALS THAT PRESIDENT, ONCE AGAIN FIRMLY IN CONTROL OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S POLICY, WISHES CALM THINGS DOWN WITH PDRY AND RE-EMPHASIZE YAR'S NON-ALIGNMENT TO ENSURE MAXIMUM SAFETY AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT WHILE GAINING TIME UNTIL YAR ENABLED STANRIN ITS OWN FEET MILIOARILY. PRESIDENT SHOWED A CALM AND FRIENDLY CONFIDENCE THAT USG WILL TAKE AN EFFICACIOUS LEAD IN COORDINATING THIS WITH AREA STATES WHICH REALIZE

THAT YEMEN AND OMAN ARE THEIR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE
AGAINST SUBVERSION FROM PDRY. PRESIDENT COMMENDABLY
RECOGNIZED NEED TO AVOID DERAILING ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE PROCESS.
CRAWFORD

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